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ITS IMPACT ON CHINESE EMPOYMENT
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It is often claimed that the WTO membership will benefit China by increasing exports and 
employment and forcing domestic firms to improve efficiency through competition. Benefits are 
expected to accrue through improved resource allocation and greater economic efficiency 
resulting from trade liberalization and greater global competition. In the paper we  argue that 
although some sectors will benefit from competition others will suffer a great deal especially in the 
short and medium terms. The net overall benefits are likely to accrue only in the long run. During 
the transition period China will face enormous problems of restructuring of state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), and banking, insurance and financial services, entailing significant loss of 
employment. The employment impact of the accession with special reference to SOEs is considered 
since they are generally less competitive than the non-state enterprises. Reduction in SOE 
employment may not be compensated by an increase in employment in the non-state sector. The 
experience of three specific industries is discussed: textiles and clothing, automobiles and 
household appliances  
 
Besides the unemployment impact of the accession, the paper examines the possibility of a 
‘flying geese model’ of trade and development working within China to maintain its global 
competitiveness on account of low labour costs in the hinterland. It also discusses China’s 
possible response to global competition to protect employment, for example. Three types of 
response are considered: non-compliance of the WTO accord, devaluation, and a production shift 







China’s accession to WTO will affect its economy in the short, medium and long runs. The key 
areas of influence are: trade liberalization (tariff reductions and abolition of non-tariff barriers (NTBs); 
trade-related investment liberalization (TRIMs); protection of intellectual property rights (TRIPs); and 
anti-dumping duties. In this paper we will discuss mainly trade liberalization under WTO rules and its 
impact on employment in the Chinese economy with particular reference to the industrial sector. The 
WTO membership is expected to help China by increasing exports and employment and forcing 
domestic firms to improve efficiency through competition. However, competition could force weak 
domestic firms to close, thereby increasing unemployment at least in the short run. Some sectors will 
benefit from competition while others will suffer a great deal especially in the short and medium 
terms. The net overall benefits are likely to accrue only in the long run. Although trade will expand 
after the accession, a large-sized country like China with a huge domestic market will find foreign 
trade less important than the smaller economies. At any rate, depending on the particular sectors 
exports will expand with a time lag due to capacity and other constraints. During the transition period 
                                                 
1 This paper is based on a field visit to China (Beijing and Guiyang in Guizhou province in Southwest China) in March–
April 2001. We are most grateful to several officials in the Chinese governmental institutions for holding discussions and 
supplying data, notably, the State Economic and Trade Commission (SETC), the Ministry of Foreign Trade and Economic 
Cooperation (MOFTEC), the Development Research Centre of the State Council, and the Ministry of Labour. We owe a 
debt of gratitude to the Provincial Government of Guizhou for arranging our trip to a state-owned factory (Box 1). A large 
number of documents available only in the Chinese language and obtained by us in Beijing have been reviewed. In the 




China will face enormous problems of restructuring of state-owned enterprises (SOEs), and banking, 
insurance and financial services, entailing significant loss of employment. 
 
Trade liberalization was accelerated in the second half of the 1990s compared to the first half, 
presumably to expedite the process of China’s entry into the WTO. It is generally believed that China’s 
tariff and non-tariff barriers are still very high. While this may be true of particular goods (e.g. 
automobiles) these barriers are not high compared to those in the Republic of Korea and Japan. In fact 
processing trade is exempted from import tariffs. Table 1 presents simulations of tariff and quota 
reductions in the post-accession period, which show that reductions will be generally higher for 
manufactured than for primary goods.  
 
The first section of the paper discusses relationship between trade, competition and employment. 
The second section is devoted to the employment impact of the accession with special reference to SOEs. 
In this context, the future of textiles and clothing, automobiles and household appliances is analysed in 
the third section as specific cases. The fourth section discusses China’s possible response to global 
competition  in the form of non-compliance of the WTO agreement, devaluation to protect inefficient 
sectors, and a production shift from tradeables to non-tradeables. The final section makes some general 




Tariff and non-tariff protection rates for China for its WTO accession 
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Source: Wang and Ma (2000). Rates are estimated by aggregating China’s tariff cuts from six-digit Harmonized Commodity Description 
and Coding System (HS) tariff schedules based on United States-China agreement (November 1999) and weighted by import data 
from China’s Customs. Estimates on China’s non-tariff barriers (NTBs) on industrial products are based on Zhang et al. (1998) and 
Li et al. (1998). 
Note:  These are estimates based on simulation exercises, rather than actual data for 2000. The import quotas for grains and plant fibres 
are assumed to grow at an annual rate of 5 per cent till 2005 when they will be eliminated and replaced by a uniform tariff of 15 
per cent. All non-tariff barriers are assumed to be reduced by 20 per cent annually from 2001 reaching zero in 2005. The opening 




I.   TRADE, COMPETITION AND EMPLOYMENT 
 
 
A few years ago the debate on North-South trade and its implications for employment and 
income inequality (e.g. Wood, 1994) explained declining manufacturing employment in the North by 
exports of labour-intensive manufactures from the South. It was assumed that de-industrialization in 
such countries as the US resulted from a lack of industrial competitiveness i n the global economy. 
However, Krugman and Lawrence (1994) argued that international trade was not the main cause of 
shrinking manufacturing employment and declining real wages of the less skilled workers in the 
United States. Instead, it was due more to s uch  domestic factors as a shift of spending from 
manufacturing to services and to automation or labour-displacing technological change. Will these 
arguments apply to China after the WTO accession? In other words, will exports raise employment 
whereas increasing import competition and lack of competitiveness of Chinese SOEs reduce 
employment in its manufacturing sector? There is no simple answer to this question since all SOEs are 
not uncompetitive. 
 
China is a semi-industrial developing country, and thus not a service economy like the United 
States. So while contracting of manufacturing employment will take place with or without the 
accession (due partly to technological unemployment and demand conditions) a substantial shift of 
spending away from manufacturing is unlikely to occur. The manufacturing trade balance – the 
difference between the amount of manufactured exports and imports, can measure an assessment of 
the overall impact of international trade on the size of the manufacturing sector. In the case of China, 




Manufactured goods trade, 1991–1999 
($ billion) 
  Total 
Chemicals and related  
products 
Goods classified chiefly by 
material 
Machinery and transport 
equipment 
Miscellaneous and other 
goods 
Year  Exports  Imports  Balance  Exports  Imports  Balance  Exports  Imports  Balance  Exports Imports  Balance  Exports  Imports  Balance 
                               
1991  55.7  52.96  2.74  3.82  9.28  -5.46  14.46  10.5  3.96  7.15  19.6  -12.45  30.28  13.58  16.7 
1992  67.94  67.33  0.61  4.35  11.16  -6.81  16.14  19.27  -3.13  13.22  31.31  -18.09  34.23  55.59  -21.36 
1993  75.08  89.75  -14.67  4.62  9.7  -5.08  16.4  28.53  -12.13  15.28  45.02  -29.74  38.78  6.5  32.28 
1994  101.3  99.13  2.17  6.24  12.13  -5.89  23.22  28.08  -4.86  21.9  51.47  -29.57  49.94  7.44  42.5 
1995  127.3  107.67  19.63  9.09  17.3  -8.21  32.24  28.77  3.47  31.41  52.64  -21.23  54.55  8.95  45.6 
1996  129.12  113.39  15.73  8.88  18.11  -9.23  28.5  31.39  -2.89  35.31  54.76  -19.45  56.44  9.13  47.31 
1997  158.84  113.75  45.09  10.23  19.3  -9.07  34.43  32.22  2.21  43.71  52.77  -9.06  70.47  9.46  61.01 
1998  163.1  117.29  45.81  10.32  20.16  -9.84  32.39  31.08  1.31  50.2  56.85  -6.65  70.2  9.21  60.99 
1999  174.99  138.85  36.14  10.37  24.03  -13.66  33.26  34.32  -1.06  58.84  69.45  -10.61  72.52  11.05  61.47 
                              
Source: China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook, 1996, 2000 (original in Chinese). 
 
Foreign competition to the Chinese industry can reduce domestic income and employment 
through the terms-of-trade effect. If the price of Chinese exports is lowered (relative to that of other 
countries due to foreign competition) and that of imports is raised, a reduction in real earnings would 
occur because China must sell its goods more cheaply but pay more for its imports. In fact, developing 
countries as a whole suffered from a decline in the terms of trade during 1985–1995; so did such 
Southeast Asian countries as the Republic of Korea, Singapore and Thailand (Yang and Vines, 2000). 
 
The impact of industrial competitiveness on China’s trade after the accession needs to be 
examined in the light of recent trends in trade growth, which are analysed below separately for 
domestic enterprises (state and non-state), SOEs and foreign-funded enterprises (FFEs). Figure 1 
illustrates the relative importance of FFEs in China’s rapid trade expansion. Table 3 gives the export 
and import growth rates for domestic enterprises and FFEs. The latter grew much more rapidly during  
 
4
the 1980s and 1990s till 1997 when trade growth rates became quite similar for both. This may be 
explained by several factors: i). FFEs started with a very low base; ii) government policy required 
foreign enterprises to export a substantial proportion of their production. FFEs are required to balance 
their foreign exchange requirements, which induces export expansion as they have to generate foreign 
exchange to pay for imports; iii) many FFEs have secured markets and distribution channels by simply 
shifting production from home countries to China to take advantage of low labour cost; and iv) a large 
proportion of FFEs is engaged in processing exports in which export value is high but locally added 
value is low. In the post-accession period, FFEs and private enterprises are likely to become 
particularly important as channels o f export and employment growth. Already FFEs play a more 
important role in export promotion than domestic enterprises. 
 
 
The import growth of foreign-funded enterprises was generally much higher until 1996, 
presumably to ensure better quality inputs (particularly, machinery, which might not have been locally 
available). Greater global competition after the accession will call for substantial increases in labour 
productivity through technological modernization, which may further increase FFEs’ import 
requirements, which may in turn discourage local sourcing of inputs, thus reducing their favourable 
employment impact.  
 
A.  Domestic and foreign competition 
 
The market structure of the Chinese industry is characterized by different degrees of protection 
and competition. The industry ownership, technology level, entry barriers and the likely economic and 
social effects of the accession are illustrated in a stylized table 4. While such industries as electronics 
and shipbuilding are competitive and thus globally integrated, others like petrochemicals and 
automobiles are heavily protected. Generally, light consumer goods industries (e.g. bicycles, textiles, 
household appliances) are more open to competition than heavy industry. 
 
Domestic competition in China has grown thanks partly to the policy of decentralization 
which induced local governments to compete with one another in order to seek profit-making 
activities. (However, in the early stages many local governments tried to set up trade barriers against 
potential c ompetitors).
2 Increased competition in the domestic market may lead to an erosion of 
market shares of inefficient domestic enterprises involving loss of employment. 
                                                 
2 Zhang, et al. 1998) state that ‘protectionism often failed because efficiency gains from exchange significantly exceeded the 
net benefits of erecting trade barriers’. Barriers imposed by local governments included sales quota for local stores to sell 
locally-made goods, prohibition of non-local manufacturers and traders from opening shops, and forcing local enterprises to 
purchase goods and inputs from local producers and suppliers. Added to these, transport bottlenecks in China create barriers 
across regions.  
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Trade, export and import growth rates for domestic and foreign firms, 1981–1999 
Trade growth rate  Export growth rate  Import growth rate 
Year  Total  Foreign 
firms
Domestic 
firms  Total  Foreign 
firms 
Domestic 




1981  15.44 232.56  15.20  21.47  292.60 21.34  9.99  222.20  9.62 
1982  -5.50 130.07  -5.94  1.41  63.43 1.32  -12.40  149.32  -13.22 
1983  4.83 87.84  4.17  -0.40  524.85 -1.65  10.89  4.19  10.98 
1984  22.76 -24.27  23.44  17.59  -79.13 19.05  28.14  38.61  28.00 
1985  29.97 404.49  26.67  4.63  330.37 3.77  54.14  417.05  48.78 
1986  6.11 27.57  5.35  13.13  96.17 12.22  1.56  17.74  0.73 
1987  11.92 43.76  10.56  27.47  107.56 25.94  0.70  28.47  -0.97 
1988  24.37 89.45  20.77  20.49  103.33 17.87  27.91  84.06  23.54 
1989  8.65 67.12  3.58  10.56  100.01 5.69  7.00  53.06  1.66 
1990  3.37 46.76  -2.71  18.18  59.04 13.96  -9.79  39.91  -18.47 
1991  17.49 43.91  11.91  15.70  54.18 10.16  19.57  37.38  14.23 
1992  22.05 51.02  14.18  18.23  44.07 13.03  26.34  55.98  15.65 
1993  18.23 53.38  5.60  8.01  45.41 -1.60  29.00  58.64  14.58 
1994  20.91 30.68  15.82  31.91  37.55 29.76  11.21  26.54  0.88 
1995  18.70 25.30  14.81  22.95  35.04 18.09  14.25  18.91  10.31 
1996  3.21 24.85  -10.68  1.53  31.21 -12.13  5.11  20.12  -8.55 
1997  12.17 11.31  12.94  21.01  21.78 20.49  2.55  2.80  2.25 
1998  -0.37 3.31  -3.63  0.50  8.09 -4.77  -1.50  -1.29  -1.74 
1999  11.32 10.67  11.94  6.11  9.47 3.46  18.15  11.95  25.65 
      Source:    China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook, 1996, 2000 (original in Chinese). 
         Note:  The domestic-foreign dichotomy is not so clear-cut in China since the FFEs also include equity joint ventures with 
Chinese enterprises besides wholly foreign-owned enterprises. Thus the above table includes domestic enterprise 
element in the foreign-funded enterprises.  
 
Table 4 









Status and impact of the 
accession 
Globally integrated/ 
competitive: Competition in 
both global and domestic 





joint ventures, or 
private. 
Low or zero.  Low or zero.  (a) Economic: 
• higher efficiency; 
• better market access. 
(b) Social: 
• increase in employment 
through increase in exports. 
Segmented/protected: 
domestic and export 
markets are segmented as 
the former is protected (e.g. 
machinery and chemicals, 
and automobiles)  
State-owned, 
collective, TVEs, 







• improved efficiency; 
• better market access. 
(b) Social: Loss of 
employment in inefficient 
enterprises; increase in 
employment in efficient ones. 
Insulated: Only domes tic 
competition, closed to 
foreign entry (e.g. 
telecommunications, 
banking and financial 
services, and 
petrochemicals). 
State-owned.  High.  Medium or 
high. 
(a) Economic: 
• scope for raising efficiency; 
• better market access. 
(b) Social: Loss in 
employment due to import 
competition; increase in 





During the reform period, China first opened up light consumer goods sector to competition. 
Although it maintained relatively higher import duties on these goods, entry barriers in light industry 
were low for both domestic and foreign enterprises. The ownership structure in light industry has 
become much more diversified due to the restructuring of SOEs and the establishment of new private 
domestic and foreign-funded enterprises. Many joint ventures have been established between domestic 
enterprises of different ownership types as well as between domestic and foreign enterprises. As a 
result, the output shares of SOEs and collectives have declined whereas those of foreign-funded 
enterprises (including those  owned by overseas Chinese) and domestic private enterprises have 
substantially increased (table 5). Apart from the policies of reform and opening up, product 
differentiation and technology modernization also played an important part in diversifying the 
ownership structure of light industry. It is estimated that in 1998 investment in technology 
improvement by foreign firms was on average four times higher than that by domestic firms including 
SOEs. China attracts foreign companies for two main reasons – huge market potential and cheap 
labour, and is increasingly becoming a manufacturing base of the world because of these factors 




Output shares of Chinese light industry by enterprise ownership 
(Per cent) 
  1991  1993  1995  1997  1999 
SOEs  50.0  43.1  33.2  29.5  22.9 
Collectives  42.4  39.9  39.2  38.4  24.8 
Enterprises funded by Hong Kong 
(China), Macao (China) and Taiwan 
Province of China firms 
-  5.1  8.7  8.3  9.5 
Foreign-funded enterprises  -  4  7.9  10.9  15.6 
Others  1.9  7.9  11.0  12.9  17.1 
Source:  China Light Industry Yearbook, various issues. 
Note:  - = not available. 
 
The market access for China’s products in the global market will depend, inter alia, on their 
price and  quality competitiveness. The fact that China’s exports of clothing, toys, footwear and 
electrical machinery continued to grow in the wake of the Asian financial crisis suggests the 
competitiveness of these products despite the depreciation and realignment of Asian currencies 
(Bhalla, 2001). Generally a static approach is adopted to compare costs of domestic producers against 
those of international producers. This method is not helpful in a dynamic setting with different levels 
and degrees of competition. Different methods of assessing competitiveness include a comparison of: 
 
•  Domestic and international costs and prices; f or example, unit cost of labour in dollars 
(Mazumdar, 1993) which can be decomposed into: (i) wage-productivity ratios, (ii) ratio of 
domestic to foreign prices, and (iii) the rate of foreign exchange. 
•  Changes in market shares and comparative advantage, which may depend on cost, technology 
and information advantages (of brand name and quality, for example). 
 
Given the data limitations, labour costs and labour productivity (or labour-output coefficient) are 






II.   THE IMPACT OF THE ACCESSION ON EMPLOYMENT IN CHINA 
 
 
To understand the impact of the accession on employment in China, we need first to examine 
the current unemployment situation and its causes, and inter-sectoral employment trends over time. 
These are discussed below.  
 
A.  The unemployment situation 
 
Generally speaking, the total labour force in a country is composed of the employed and 
unemployed population. However, the official unemployment statistics vary in different economies 
and  countries due to different definitions and concepts. It is particularly true when we consider 
unemployment in China. First,  the official  unemployment statistics refer only to the urban areas 
including towns, excluding vast rural areas where there are currently  about 130 million redundant 
workers. Second, the unemployment figures take into account only those who have registered and 
exclude those who are still on the payroll but are not actually working (e.g. xiagang), whether they are 
paid or not,  or paid fully or partially. Third, unemployment registration  includes only those people 
whose age is between 16–50 for men and 16–45 for women, and those who have the ability to work 
and who want to work, whilst the official retirement age is 60 years for men and 55 years for women. 
Thus the registered unemployment age is 10 years shorter than the official working age. It understates 
the true level of unemployment. 
 
It is estimated that during the tenth Five Year Plan (2001–2005), the registered unemployment 
rate will reach 3.5 per cent. Half of the provinces will not be able to reabsorb more than 50 per cent of 
laid-off workers. Rural redundant labour will continue to increase. The loss of employment as a result 
of economic reforms and slimming down of the government services amounted to 4.3 million staff and 
workers. Urban unemployment in China has become more serious. The hidden unemployment in 
urban and rural areas is estimated to be around 27 per cent (Yang, 1998). Therefore, the real 
unemployment rate would be much higher and is estimated at over 8 per cent (see Hu, 1999). 
 
Since the economic reforms, the following features characterize employment in China. First, 
reduction in employment in the state sector has to a very large extent been matched by an increase in 
employment in the non-state sector, especially the private sector, which is growing at an annual rate of 
more than 20 per cent with net job creation at about 6 million (People’s Daily, 5 July 2001). Second, 
employment has been shifting from primary and secondary sectors to the tertiary sector. Many rural 
people migrated to urban areas to work in such activities as domestic help, cleaning, maintenance and 
repair, building and construction, restaurants and so on. There are 80 million so-called floating 
workers across the country. Although some of them are seasonal workers, many are staying 
permanently in the urban areas. Third, a  large proportion of laid-off workers become permanently 
unemployed. It is increasingly difficult for these workers to be re-employed in conditions of labour 
over-supply. According to an official statistical bulletin, in the first half of 2001, out of 7.69 million 
laid-off workers, only 0.79 million succeeded in obtaining other jobs; the re-employment rate was only 
11 per cent. A survey of labour demand and supply in 59 large and medium cities showed that there 
was only 0.65 job for every jobseeker (People’s Daily, 30 July 2001). 
 
Some studies argue that economic growth in China will involve a shift in production towards 
capital- and technology-intensive goods, which will require fewer workers implying a low 
employment elasticity of output. Although the Chinese economy maintains a 7–8 per cent growth rate, 
the employment elasticity has been declining. In 1980, 1 per cent of GDP growth rate led to an 
increase in employment by 0.33 per cent; during the ninth Five Year Plan period (1996–2000), the 
figure dropped to 0.16 per cent ( People’s Daily, 30 July 2001). Therefore,  it is very difficult to 
increase employment simply by promoting economic growth.   
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B.  Inter-sectoral employment trends  
 
We need to examine the trends in inter-sectoral employment and shifts between primary, 
secondary and tertiary sectors to determine which tradeable and non-tradeable sectors will absorb the 
unemployed. Between 1952 and 1998, the primary sector remained the major absorber of labour, 
followed by the secondary sector until 1994 when its share was overtaken by the tertiary sector 
(figure 2). The trend for greater employment in the tertiary sector is likely to continue and to become 
more significant in the post-accession period. It is widely believed that the traditional labour-intensive 
sectors (e.g. textiles and clothing, food processing, construction and services) will benefit within five 
years after the accession.
3 
 
Obviously the impact of the accession will not be evenly spread across sectors and industries. 
Most observers believe that the potential for employment growth  is minimal  or negative in such 
sectors as agriculture, automobiles and machinery and instruments. Some estimate that employment 
in  the agricultural sector will be reduced by 9.66 million (or 3.6 per cent of the total ), automobiles 
4.98 million, (14.5 per cent of current employed work force), and machinery and instrument, 5.82 
million  (2.5 per cent of current employment),  in seven years after the accession (Beijing Evening 
News, 18 November 1999). Ianchovichina et al ., (2000) compare changes in output and employment 
in selected Chinese industries with and without accession during 1995–2005 (table 6). They estimate 
that a gain in employment of unskilled workers will occur in the following industries: foodgrains, 
meat and livestock and dairy products, clothing, and electronics. On the other hand, employment will 
decline in beverages and tobacco, textiles, wood and paper, petrochemicals, automobiles, 
trade/transport, and utilities. Although estimated increases in agricultural output and employment are 
lower, we still believe that these estimates are over-optimistic considering that foodgrains, feedgrains 
and oilseeds are land-intensive crops in which China has no comparative advantage. Domestic prices 
for these commodities are much higher than the world prices. For example, domestic price for rice is 
40 per cent higher than the world price, wheat, 10 per cent higher, maize, 60 per cent higher, soya 
bean, 40 per cent higher, and oil, 30 per cent higher. However, in other primary export products 
including meat, fishery products, vegetables, fruits, tobacco leaves, China will still maintain a 
comparative advantage as these products do not need much land and they can utilize redundant labour 
(Chen, 2001). 
                                                 
3 Employment estimates for these sectors are as follows:, textiles 2, 825 thousand, clothing 2,610 thousand, food processing 
168 thousand, construction 928 thousand and service sector 2,664 thousand (Economic Daily, 11 July 2001).  
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Output and employment changes in China’s selected industries/sectors 
(Percentage change between 1995 and 2005) 
  Output  Employment 
of skilled labour 
Employment of unskilled 
labour 












             
Foodgrains  46.3  44.5  30.1  28.5  19.4  17.9 
Feedgrains  28.9  26.9  14.4  12.6  7.2  5.5 
Oilseeds  32.4  32.3  17.7  17.7  10.3  10.2 
Meat & livestock  75.0  81.3  63.0  69.8  41.5  47.3 
Dairy  74.9  84.4  60.6  70.5  35.0  43.2 
Other agriculture  53.2  50.0  37.2  34.3  28.6  25.8 
Other food  50.5  51.8  -11.0  -10.7  -34.5  -34.3 
Beverages/tobacco  80.7  13.8  2.2  -36.1  -24.8  -53.0 
Extractive industries  61.9  60.2  63.7  60.8  54.9  52.2 
Textiles  71.6  88.0  6.2  15.5  -24.8  -18.3 
Clothing  57.0  263.5  2.4  134.4  -27.5  65.9 
Wood & paper  103.6  93.9  27.8  20.9  -9.5  -14.5 
Petrochemicals  105.8  98.6  14.8  10.0  -18.7  -22.2 
Metals  135.7  126.2  30.5  24.3  -7.6  -12.0 
Automobiles  189.6  -3.8  53.1  -51.2  8.4  -65.5 
Electronics  142.5  169.1  38.2  52.1  -2.2  7.6 
Other manufactures  131.7  125.5  45.0  40.1  2.7  -0.8 
Utilities  103.2  101.2  0.4  -1.5  -28.9  -30.3 
Trade/transport  110.9  114.4  0.8  1.3  -36.4  -36.1 
Construction  147.9  149.0  119.7  119.9  49.7  49.7 
Business/finance  104.6  105.1  26.4  25.9  -10.5  -10.9 
Government services  85.0  85.9  56.3  56.6  10.7  10.8 
Source:  Ianchovichina et al. (2000). 
Note:  The above simulations are based on a new version of the Global Trade Analysis Project (GTAP) model. 
Projections for population and unskilled labour were made by summing up the average growth rates between 
1995 and the projected 2005 data. The skilled labour projections were based on forecasts of the growth in the 
stock of tertiary educated labour. 
 
 
C.  The employment impact of the accession  
 
Estimates of the employment impact vary widely, from creating additional 12 million jobs to 
causing million  of jobs losses. Zhang, et al. (1998) note that the short-term costs to China of trade 
liberalization will be substantial ‘both in terms of the loss of domestic output (a drop of about 
$40 billion, or 32 per cent of pre-liberalization output in the protected sectors) and lost jobs (about 
11.2 million workers in the protected sectors). Salomon Smith Barney, the investment bank, estimates 
that within five years after the WTO entry,  China will have 40 million people unemployed, 5 –10 
million rural workers, 10 million laid-off SOE workers, and 20 million non-SOE workers (Far Eastern 
Economic Review, 5 October 2000). These forecasts need to be viewed against the official benchmark 
for end-2001 of the total registered urban unemployment of nearly 7 million, not including 
5.15 million worker lay-offs in SOEs (China Daily, 7 February 2002). 
 
The employment  impact will vary depending on the assumptions one makes about the 
employment elasticity of output, the extent to which imported goods will replace domestic goods and 
the magnitude of bankruptcies of inefficient state and non-state firms. Estimates of the employment 
elasticity by sectors and time periods show that it has declined in primary and secondary sectors 
(table 7). It is generally higher in the tertiary sector, which is likely to absorb the bulk of labour 
displaced as a result of the accession. On the basis of the average elasticity for 1995–1999 and the 
employment figure for 1999, we estimate that for every per cent of GDP growth, jobs in the primary 
sector will be reduced by 250 thousand, and those in the secondary and tertiary sectors will increase by 
150 thousand and 970 thousand respectively. But this static analysis may overstate the increase in 
unemployment in the primary sector, since for every 1 per cent GDP growth rate this sector’s 
contribution will be primary sector may simply nullify employment increase in the secondary sector so  
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that the net increase for every per cent GDP 
growth would be  just under 1  million. This 
estimate is more or less smaller than 1 per cent 
under current and future economic conditions. 
Employment reduction in the consistent with 
the job creation since 1993, that is, about 
7 million new jobs every year (Niu, 1999). 
 
According to official estimates, there 
will be 8 million new entrants to the job 
market each year in the urban areas and there 
will be 10 million SOEs laid-off workers 
during the tenth Five Year Plan (2001–2005). 
Therefore, the total labour supply from  the 
urban areas will be about 50 million during 
this period. Apart from labour supply from the 
urban areas, there are 40 million rural surplus 
workers wishing to transfer out of agriculture ( People’s Daily, 26 March 2001).  To absorb this 
magnitude of labour is a daunting task especially in conditions of world economic slowdown, which 
will adversely affect demand for China’s exports and its overall economic growth. Lower GDP growth 
and more capital- and technology-intensive development will reduce the demand for labour. The 
government expects that registered unemployment will increase from 3.3 per cent to 5 per cent during 
2001–2005. 
 
However, one needs to bear in mind that some positive factors will help generate additional 
employment. First, the accession will encourage more foreign direct investment (FDI) into China as a 
result of which more jobs will be created. China has increasingly become the world’s manufacturing 
base due to its abundant and cheap labour supply. Multinational companies have relocated many of 
their product lines from the developed countries to China (e.g. Toshiba TV and washing machines 
from Japan (see below)) to avail of China’s cheap labour, low-cost production and a potentially very 
big market. So far FDI has concentrated mainly on industry and property development. In 1999, 
investment in  these sectors accounted for 84 per cent of the total (Yu and Yu, 2001). Second,  it is 
expected that such  activities  as retailing, distribution, and tourism will create more employment 
opportunities after the relaxation of restrictions on sectors in which foreign companies can invest. 
Third, China’s service sector will expand to provide services related to different stages of exports. As 
more foreign companies set up business in China,  various  services to these companies will be 
required: e.g. accountants, lawyers, engineering and other consultants and supporting staff. Finally, 
China is a large economy and its size will enable it to be in a better position to face external shocks. 
 
The Chinese economic cycle is not synchronized with the world economy as China has been 
growing rapidly in the past even when other countries grew slowly. T he domination of labour-
intensive goods in its export structure is likely to enable China to increase its exports since consumers 
in advanced countries may become more conscious of the value for money when their incomes and 
jobs are under threat. One good example of this is the success of China’s expansion of exports to 
Japan when the Japanese economy was slowing down. Especially since 1993 China’s trade with Japan 
soared from $25.4 billion in 1992 to $66.2 billion 1999, or an increase of nearly 161 per cent. Of the 
total trade, exports increased from $11.7 billion to $32.4 billion, and imports from $13.7 billion to 
$33.8 billion during the same period (China Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook). According to the 
Japanese Ministry of Finance, the total trade between the two countries reached nearly $86 billion in 
2000: China exported $55 billion worth of goods to Japan. The Chinese official estimates are 
somewhat lower (that is, $83 billion and $42 billion respectively) due to a different treatment of some 
trade volumes through third countries or regions such as Hong Kong (China) (Miyanori, 2001).  
 
Table 7 
Employment elasticity of output 
Period  Primary  Secondary  Tertiary 
1955-59  -9.64  0.57  1.83 
1960-64  2.70  -0.15  0.99 
1965-69  1.10  0.12  2.32 
1970-74  0.50  1.35  0.39 
1975-79  -0.05  -0.19  3.98 
1980-84  -0.09  0.89  0.70 
1985-89  0.52  0.29  0.43 
1990-94  0.22  1.00  2.00 
1995-99  -0.07  0.09  0.51 
Source:  Based on GDP and employment data calculated on the 
basis of data from the China Statistical Yearbook, and 
China Labour Statistical Yearbook. 




D.  Employment and lay-offs in SOEs and other enterprises 
 
Employment data in manufacturing SOEs by type of industry are hard to find. Therefore, it is 
not possible to determine any time trend. However, data are available for 1998 to 2000, which show 
the importance of such industries as machinery manufacturing, textiles, petroleum processing and 
non-metal mineral products (table 8). 
 
Table 8 





















National total  
Food processing 
Textiles 
Garments & other fibre products 
Leather & related products 
Timber processing (bamboo, cane) 
Furniture making 
Papermaking & paper products 
Printing 
Stationery, educational & sports goods 
Petroleum processing  
Chemicals & chemical fibres 
Medical & pharmaceutical products 
Rubber products 
Plastic products 
Non-metal mineral products 
Smelting/processing of metals 
Metal products 
Machinery manufacturing  
Transport equipment  
Electric equipment & machinery  

























































































































































Source:  China Labour Statistical Yearbook (original in Chinese).  
Note:  Percentages may not add up to 100 due to rounding.  
1 (000). 
 
A negative impact of the accession on employment will be felt through import competition and 
the resulting closure of inefficient domestic firms, especially SOEs, after the withdrawal of subsidies. 
However no estimates exist of the significance of such closures. Redundant labour is concentrated 
mainly in SOEs and urban collectives (Bhalla, 2001). This is not surprising considering that during 
the pre-reform period, the Chinese government used SOEs as a mechanism to ensure full 
employment. SOEs were expected to provide employment not only to workers who were not 
necessary for production but also to their children. The government subsidies continue to finance 
wages of such workers. The Chinese government is known to have discouraged SOEs from shedding 
surplus labour in the face of the problem of massive lay-offs and resulting social instability. 
 
Although in theory, the Chinese government now allows SOEs to lay off workers, in practice 
labour market flexibility (hiring and firing) is not common due in part to the failure of a 
comprehensive social security  system and limited resources for social welfare at the level of local 
governments. Labour mobility is restricted by the fact that workers forego social welfare benefits of 
housing, education and health services (and even pensions) once they leave SOEs. These benefits are 
not available to workers employed under other forms of ownership (e.g. joint ventures, collectives 
and private enterprises). Nevertheless, SOEs competing in the export market are increasingly 
permitted to hire and fire workers (Box 1 – a visit to an SOE factory in Guizhou province where 
guaranteed employment is not pursued). Restructuring of the labour market and a shift from  
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guaranteed permanent employment to more flexible contract employment is bound to become a 
common practice after the accession, especially as a means of reducing production costs. 
 
Lay-offs are only one element in employment reduction, which the Chinese authorities do not 
include in estimating the unemployment rate. Other elements include early retirements, normal 
retirements, natural attrition, and unemployment due to technological, structural and cyclical 
phenomena.
4  But ‘ xiagang’ (or furlough) policy of lay-offs was preceded by policies of labour 
redeployment not involving lay-offs: transferring redundant workers to such subsidiary enterprises as 
hotels and restaurants, and ‘labour service companies’ (Rawski, 1999). We mentioned earlier that 
more and more SOE workers have lost their jobs, as a result of restructuring, sale of enterprises or 
bankruptcies. Almost half of the laid-off or unemployed workers simply cannot find new jobs,  and 
many prefer to take early retirement, Even when some get re-employed, they find jobs mostly in the 
non-state or private sector. Thus in the post-accession period, state sector in industry will be much 
smaller in respect of both output and employment. Additional jobs will be created mainly in the 
private sector. It is estimated that during 1995–1997 China’s domestic private enterprises created more 
jobs than those in state, collective and town and village enterprises (TVEs). The contribution of the 
private sector to employment in the 1990s is known to have been under-estimated as some private 
enterprises are reluctant to register for fear of being taxed, and others are disguised as rural or urban 
collectives (Zhu, 1998). Therefore, a look at the employment situation over time in SOEs in isolation 
is not all that helpful. We need to compare the declining employment in SOEs with increase in 
employment in private sector and other ownership types (e.g. joint ventures, cooperatives, and limited 
liability corporations (figure 3). While employment in SOEs has been consistently declining since 
1995 and in urban collectives since 1993, that in TVEs, private sector and other ownership categories 
has been rising, particularly in the last two categories. This trend (also noted below in the automotive 
industry) is likely to continue after the accession. The relevant question is whether the private sector 
and other forms of ownership will eventually make up for the loss of employment in SOEs. This is 




Visit to a State-owned Enterprise in Guizhou Province (Southwest China) 
 
On 9 April 2001, we visited the Zhenning Hongbeiye Limited, a subsidiary of Guizhou Redstar Development Corporation. It 
was set up in October 1995 by its parent company, Qingdao Redstar Chemical Industry Group, a large state-owned company 
producing non-organic salt products. In 1994, the market conditions for chemical industry were not favourable. So the parent 
company decided to transfer the production of some products to locations close to natural resources and raw materials: 
Zhenning Bouyi and Miao Autonomous County with plentiful heavy crystal stone, lime stone, coal resources and power 
supply. As a nationally-designated poor county, it is a partner-county of Qiaodao in a scheme under which the cities in the 
Eastern areas help the Western region in alleviating poverty. 
Zhenning Hongbeiye company produces carbon-acid barium and carbon-acid strontium, products with wide industrial 
applications, especially for making TV or computer glass screens. Majority of its products are exported to the American, 
European and other international markets. The products of the factory are high quality and globally competitive. Many 
international suppliers of the products have stopped production to buy products from this factory. 
The factory is run quite differently from its parent company. Workers are mainly employed locally and currently there are 
about 800 workers on the site we visited. They are employed on a contract basis and do not enjoy guaranteed employment for 
life as during earlier years. For new workers, a probationary period of three months has been introduced. No worker can be 
transferred to a contract position unless he or she fulfils the minimum performance requirements. Every year a 
comprehensive assessment of workers’ performance is undertaken and 5 per cent of the top performers are awarded extra 
bonus. The bottom 5 per cent are placed on a three-month probation. A worker must leave the factory at the end of the 
probationary period if he/she cannot find an alternative job within it. Wage structure consists of a basic wage plus bonus: 
about one-third consists of basic wage and two-thirds, performance-related payment. Unlike many other SOEs, this factory 
had no obligation to provide such social services as health and education for workers.  
The workforce is mainly recruited from among former retired soldiers, school-leavers and farmers. Extensive training is 
given to new workers. 




                                                 
4 Rawski (1999) divides Chinese unemployment into three categories: (i) cyclical unemployment depending on export boom 
or decline in foreign sales, (ii) transition unemployment which is unrelated to labour demand and supply conditions, and (iii) 





The diversity of ownership in China’s manufacturing sector noted above, is the direct result of 
a gradual marketization of the economy since 1980, which reformers believed would facilitate 
domestic competition. Indeed, initially China did not privatize but encouraged the growth of TVEs to 
provide competition to SOEs (Bhalla, 2001). However, since 1995 small SOEs have been privatized 
at the county level whereas large SOEs remain state-owned. The latter benefit from subsidies either 
directly by the government or by the commercial banks. There are two distinguishing features of 
SOEs compared to collectives and non-state enterprises. First, they are generally less profitable and 
competitive. Empirical estimates show that their total factor productivity has been rising although not 
as fast as that of collective enterprises and TVEs.
5 Secondly, most large SOEs are concentrated in 
capital-intensive sectors whereas the non-state sector is engaged in labour-intensive activities in 
which China has a comparative advantage. China’s trade sector is quite dualistic: TVEs and joint 
ventures account for a substantial value and volume of China’s exports, whereas SOEs are less 
important exporters. 
 
Various official and unofficial estimates of labour surplus in Chinese SOEs are now available. 
Two notable features of these estimates are: i) a very wide range and ii) their partial and micro nature. 
The estimates vary depending on the assumptions and the perceptions of enterprise managers since 
they are based on interview surveys. Lim, et al. (1996, p. 31) estimate labour surplus in Chinese 
industrial SOEs and other forms of ownership on the basis of an ILO field survey undertaken in 
February–March 1995. ‘In job’ labour surplus was estimated by asking enterprise managers whether 
the same level of output could be achieved with fewer workers, and if so, by what percentage. The 
responding enterprises noted that labour could be cut by 17 per cent of their current total workforce. 
Amongst all the ownership categories, the highest level of labour surplus was reported in joint stock 
companies (18.9 per cent) followed by labour service enterprises (16.4 per cent) and state-owned 
enterprises (15.6 per cent). One needs to be careful in interpreting the above data based on managers’ 
responses. We do not question the existence of surplus labour but the feasibility of removing it at 
least in the short run in a labour surplus economy. This will be particularly difficult considering that 
WTO accession will add to the unemployment problem, as had been noted above. 
                                                 
5 Empirical estimates of total factor productivity in SOEs, collectives and TVEs vary a great deal as they are sensitive to the 
price deflators used for inputs and outputs. For review of this literature, see Huang, et al. (1999).  
 
Figure 3




















SOEs Collectives TVEs Private Other
Source:  Based on China Labour Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
 
14
The official estimates of surplus labour, including lay-offs in different types of enterprises are 
presented in table 9. 
 
In addition to the ‘in job’ labour 
surplus, a phenomenon peculiar to China is 
that of ‘on leave’ surplus labour (xiagang or 
lay-offs) which represents a phased labour 
redundancy in SOEs. Although these workers 
vacate their posts, they continue to be paid a 
partial salary or allowances during a specified 
period during which they are encouraged to 
look for alternative jobs. There were about 5.6 
million such workers in 1995 whose number 
increased to 16 million in 1998 (Yang and 
Tam, 1999). This dramatic increase in ‘on 
leave’ workers may be explained by an 
increase in the number of SOE bankruptcies. Initially, xiagang applied to bankruptcies and closures 
only but its coverage gradually widened to include the following: (i) those with reduced salary; (ii) 
those who retired or left on prolonged leave; and (iii) those awaiting reassignment within the 
enterprise (Lee, 2000). 
 
Table 10 
Magnitude and characteristics of laid -off workers by ownership categories, 1998 
 
SOEs
1  Per cent  Urban 
collectives
1  Per cent  Other 
firms
1  Per cent 
Lay-offs at the end of 1997 6918        2665                               301
Additional lay-offs during 1998 5622  1570  197  
Reduction of lay-offs during 1998 6592  1721  261  
   Of which:  re-employed during 1998 6099 100.00 1518 100.00 222 100.00 
     SOEs 1663 27.27 148 9.75 21 9.46 
     Non state-owned firms  1687  27.66  552  36.36  62  27.93 
     Private self-employed  2581  42.32  781  51.45  135  60.81 
Total laid-off workers at the end of 1998  5948  100.00  2514  100.00  307  100.00 
   Of which: female workers  2684  45.12  1132  45.03  110  35.83 
   Of which: 35 years and below  2106  35.41  708  28.16  103  33.55 
     35–46 years  2473  41.58  1129  44.91  117  38.11 
     Above 46 years  1368  23.00  677  26.93  87  28.34 
   Of which: Middle school and below  3301  55.50  1537  61.14  163  53.09 
     Secondary school  2211  37.17  822  32.70  119  38.76 
     College and other higher education  436  7.33  156  6.21  25  8.14 
Source: Data supplied by the Ministry of Labour. 
1 (000). 
 
Slow retrenchment no doubt eases social hardship, but it continues to remain a financial burden 
on SOEs. The total cost to SOEs of paying surplus workers is estimated to be Y96 billion which was 
twice the total SOE profits in 1997 (Lee, 2000). Xiagang workers continue to receive subsidies and 
social insurance fees from their employing SOEs apart from receiving a partial salary. In contrast, 
fully redundant workers do not benefit from such assistance although they may receive some 
unemployment benefits from the local labour bureaus. 
 
Table 9 
Estimates of surplus labour in Chinese SOEs  
and other enterprises 
(000) 
  1993  1994  1995  1996 
All SOEs  544  1,202  6,570  6,593 
    Manufacturing SOEs  308  677  4,314  3,233 
Urban collectives  -  314  2,101  2,845 
Other enterprises  -  61  155  212 
Source: Data supplied by the Ministry of Labour. 
Note: Surplus labour includes lay-offs. Data on surplus 
labour are not available since 1996 possibly because 
such data are replaced by those on lay-offs and 
unemployment.  - = not available.  
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Women accounted for a substantial proportion of lay-offs in SOEs, urban collectives and other 
enterprises. Older workers (35–46 years) predominate among the lay-offs. A substantial proportion of 
laid-off workers have low educational qualifications (table 10). The older age of laid-off workers, 
combined with low education, make it difficult to retrain and re-employ them. 
 
Table 11 
Employment and worker lay-off in coastal and non-coastal areas by ownership categories, 1999 
(1000) 



























National total  85721  6,525 7.61  17118  2,589 15.13  18463  257.4 1.394  121302 9371.5  7.7 
I.  Coastal areas 
Tianjin  1185  144.8 12.2  305  52 17.05  627  1.2 0.191  2117 198  9.4 
Beijing  2876  29 1.01  497  2.8 0.563  950  0  4323 31.8  0.7 
Hebei  4474  196.8 4.4  686  55.5 8.09  592  2.6 0.439  5752 254.9  4.4 
Liaoning  4472  678 15.2  1141  452.5 39.66  852  29 3.404  6465 1159.5  17.9 
Shanghai  2197  98.5 4.48  394  36 9.137  1081       3672    
Jiangsu  4555  170.5 3.74  1427  100.3 7.029  1379  11.3 0.819  7361 282.1  3.8 
Zhejiang  2242  56.3 2.51  731  46 6.293  1111  2.5 0.225  4084 104.8  2.6 
Shandong  5799  143.1 2.47  1207  82.7 6.852  1249  3.2 0.256  8255 229  2.8 
Fujian  1795  29.3 1.63  371       1122       3288    
Hainan  688  38.9 5.65  46  4.4 9.565  82  0.2 0.244  816 43.5  5.3 
Guangdong  4499  135.1 3  1227  123.6 10.07  2210  7.2 274  7936 265.9  3.4 
Guangxi  2442  127.6 5.23  311  5.2 1.672  313  1.8 0.575  3066 134.6  4.4 
  Total  37224  1847.9 4.96  8343  961 11.52  11568  59 2204  57135 2867.9  5.0 
II.  Non-coastal areas  
Guizhou  1628  109.6 6.73  217  19.7 9.078  201  0.8 0.398  2046 130.1  6.4 
Sichuan   4052  296.3 7.31  824  103.9 12.61  732  29.9 4.085  5608 430.1  7.7 
Chongqing  1612  135.1 8.38  361  57.8 16.01  289     2262 192.9  8.5 
Yunnan  2366  58.8 2.49  288  5.5 1.91  268       2922    
Hunan  3864  524.5 13.6  623  226.8 36.4  270  7 2.593  4757 758.3  15.9 
Hubei  4449  414.5 9.32  767  205.5 26.79  606  39.4 6.502  5822 659.4  11.3 
Henan  4753  262.6 5.52  1458  121.9 8.361  1207  12.7 1.052  7418 397.2  5.4 
Anhui  2866  287.6 10  741  136.4 18.41  589  4.6 0.781  4196 428.6  10.2 
Jiangxi   2498  261.9 10.5  371  59.6 16.06  272  4.7 1.728  3141 326.2  10.4 
Heilongjiang  4552  740.5 16.3  891  394.2 44.24  526  83 15.78  5969 1217.7  20.4 
Jilin  2696  339.7 12.6  494  117.1 23.7  389  5.3 1.362  3579 462.1  12.9 
Inner Mongolia  2133  129.2 6.06  304     393     2830 129.2  4.6 
Shanxi  2945  200.5 6.81  523  49 9.369  453  1.9 0.419  3921 251.4  6.4 
Shaaxi  2802  325 11.6  332  102.9 30.99  328  8.2 2.5  3462 436.1  12.6 
Gansu  1704  156.9 9.21  269  17 6.32  134  0.04 0.03  2107 173.94  8.3 
Qinghai  468  61.1 13.1  55  0.9 1.636  13     536 62  11.6 
Ningxia   523  39.5 7.55  54  3.7 6.852  78  0.3 37  655 6.6  6.6 
Xinjiang  2426  87.5 3.61  190  6.1 3.211  140  0.5 0.357  2756 94.1  3.4 
Tibet  159     11     5     175    
  Total  48496  4430.8 9.14  8773  1628 18.56  6893  198.34 2.877  64162 6257.14  9.8 
Source: Data supplied by the Ministry of Labour. 
Note: The laid-off workers are the total figure at the end of year, which is the previous year-end total plus new lay-offs 
minus those who were re-employed during the year. 
 
There are considerable variations in lay-offs by regions and by types of ownership of enterprises 
(table 11), Lay-offs are more significant among SOEs and urban collectives than among other 
ownership types (e.g. joint ventures, cooperatives). The latter types do not over-hire in the first place.  
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Lay-offs by SOEs in non-coastal provinces (e.g. Heilongjiang, Hubei, Hunan and Jilin) are generally 
higher than those in coastal provinces although there are exceptions like Liaoning. These four non-
coastal provinces alone account for nearly 46 per cent of the total number of lay-offs in the non-
coastal areas/provinces. Historically, heavy machine building and other industries such as textiles, 
armaments and chemical engineering were located in the hinterland for military and security reasons. 
These industries use old technology and production facilities, which are now being modernized, 
resulting in large-scale lay-offs. This process of technological modernization will become much more 




III.   CASE STUDIES OF SELECTED INDUSTRIES 
 
 
How will exports, output and employment in particular industries be affected after the 
accession? To answer this question, three cases are discussed below: a) textiles and clothing, a global 
competitor; b) automobiles, a highly protected industry and c) household appliances, an industry in 
which domestic Chinese firms have improved market shares in the face of foreign competition. 
 
A.  Textiles and clothing 
 
China is one of the largest producers of textile products in the world. The textile industry plays 
an important role in its economy. The total share of China’s textile exports in the world exports of 
textiles increased from 2.6 per cent in 1970 to 13.2 per cent in 1998 (Shi, 2001). This increase in 
exports was achieved in a very difficult international market environment. The developing-country 
exports faced quantitative restrictions by the d eveloped countries, which included global quotas, 
bilaterally negotiated quotas and unilateral quotas.
6 The industry is still the biggest foreign exchange 
earner. The average annual trade surplus generated by these exports from 1994 to 1998 was more than 
$2.4 billion dollars, higher than the surplus generated by any other sectors. However, the industry 
shows a declining trend in terms of shares of output, employment and export (table 12 and figure 4). 
Among the export sectors the ranking of the industry dropped from 1 to 2 (surpassed by electrical and 
machinery product exports since 1996).
7 
 
Rural non-state textile sector, including small-scale private sector, has been growing rapidly at 
the expense of large SOE sector especially during the mid-1980s and 1990s. Output of rural textile and 
clothing industry increased from over Y37 billion in 1991 (at 1990 prices) to Y104 billion in 1998 
(table 12). The non-state sector out-performs the state sector due to lower labour costs, which make 
possible lower prices and greater flexibility in production and marketing. Higher labour costs in the 
SOE sector are due mainly to overstaffing. China’s state-owned textile industry has made efforts to 
reduce over-capacity and check over-staffing by shedding labour in a drive to modernize. From the 
early 1998 to the end of 1999 China reduced spindles by 9 million and redeployed 1.2 million workers 
to other sectors (Shi, 2001; China’s Textile Economy, Vol. 1, 2001). But the non-state sector continues 
to out-perform the state sector. 
                                                 
6 The most common form of quantitative restrictions is the bilaterally negotiated quota (e.g. between China and 
the United States), which is  determined through negotiations of the total amount of textile products and 
categories to be traded. This quota is expected to be revised in the coming years. 
7 Before the mid-1970s, China’s textile industry served mainly the domestic market and the annual total export of textiles 
then was $1 billion. Since the normalization of the United States-China relationship in 1979, China’s export of textile 
products and clothing increased very significantly and the export to the United States market rose to $550 million in 1979, 
$1.04 billion in 1980, $1.83 billion in 1981 and $2.22 billion in 1982. This dramatic increase in exports to the United States 
caused concerns in that country and led to the imposition of quota restrictions on textile and clothing imports from China. 
The first agreement on imports of textile products from China was signed in September 1980. Under the agreement the 
United States applied quota restrictions on eight textile products and put a ceiling on annual growth rates of the quotas at 5–6 




Basic economic data on China's textiles and clothing industry 
  1991  1993  1995  1997 1998 
 
I. Enterprises with independent accounting system at township level and above  
Textiles: 
No. of enterprises (000)  24.6  24.6  25.7  21.8 11.2 
Employment (million)  7.56  6.8  6.7  5.96 3.93 
Output value (billion yuan)  253.3  352.1  460.4  476 437.6 
Output value (billion yuan at 1990 prices)  246.2  289.8  291.4  288.7 269.6 
Output per worker (yuan at 1990 prices)  32,566  42,617  43,492  48,439 68,600 
Clothing: 
No. of enterprises (000)  17.5  17.9  20  17.2 6.8 
Employment (million)  1.72  1.64  1.75  1.62 1.27 
Output value (billion yuan)  12.2  99.4  147  184.5 201.8 
Output value (billion yuan at 1990 prices)  11.9  81.8  93.0  111.9 124.3 
Output per worker (yuan at 1990 prices)      6,918  49,878  53,143  69,074 97,874 
 
II. Township and village enterprises 
Textiles: 
No. of enterprises   29348  31530  29326  24839 21226 
Employment (million)  3.21  3.37  3.22  2.73 2.31 
Output value (billion yuan)  84.91  184.9  348.13  291.81 263.99 
Output value (billion yuan at 1990 prices)  82.5  152.2  220.3  177.0 162.7 
Output per worker (yuan at 1990 prices)  25,700  45,163  68,416  64,835 70,433 
Clothing: 
No. of enterprises   18264  23254  30649  27483 22971 
Employment (million)  1.30  1.57  2.34  2.27 2.14 
Output value (billion yuan)  23.2  59.67  171.63  190.01 187.41 
Output value (billion yuan at 1990 prices)  22.5  49.1  108.6  115.2 115.5 
Output per worker (yuan at 1990 prices)  17,307  31,274  46,410  50,749 53,972 
 
III. Village enterprises 
Textiles: 
No. of enterprises  16994  18886  17551  14879 12714 
Employment (million)  1.11  1.21  1.15  0.98 0.83 
Output value (billion yuan)  29.59  64.72  125.97  102.13 92.40 
Output value (billion yuan at 1990 prices)  28.8  53.3  79.7  61.9 56.9 
Output per worker (yuan at 1990 prices)  25,945  44,049  69,304  63,163 68,554 
Clothing: 
No. of enterprises  11899  16278  22349  19238 16080 
Employment (million)  0.62  0.79  1.23  1.14 1.07 
Output value (billion yuan)  8.5  24.35  76.82  77.52 76.46 
Output value (billion yuan at 1990 prices)  8.3  20.0  48.6  47.0 47.1 
Output per worker (yuan at 1990 prices)  13,387  25,316  39,512  41,228 44,019 
 
IV. National total (I+III) 
Textiles:  
No. of enterprises  41594  43486  43251  36679 23914 
Employment (million)  8.67  8.01  7.85  6.94 4.76 
Output value (billion yuan)  282.89  416.82  586.37  578.13 530.00 
Output value (billion yuan at 1990 prices)  274.9  343.1  371.1  350.6 326.6 
Output per worker (yuan at 1990 prices)  31,707  42,834  47,274  50,519 68,613 
Clothing: 
No. of enterprises  29399  34178  42349  36438 22880 
Employment (million)  2.34  2.43  2.98  2.76 2.34 
Output value (billion yuan)  20.7  123.75  223.82  262.02 278.26 
Output value (billion yuan at 1990 prices)  20.1  101.8  141.7  158.9 171.4 
Output per worker (yuan at 1990 prices)  8,589  41,893  47,550  57,572 73,248 
 
Source: Data for enterprises with independent systems come from China Statistical Yearbook, various issues and figures for TVEs come 
from China's Township and Village Enterprises Yearbook, various issues. 
Note: The village enterprises’ figures for 1997 and 1998 were estimated based on the average share of village enterprises as the total 
TVEs for 1991, 1992, 1994, 1995 and 1996.  Output value at 1990 price was deflated by general price index.  
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Table 12 shows that employment declined in textile enterprises under the independent accounting 
system and TVEs. However it increased in TVE clothing enterprises. It is likely that this trend will 
continue after the accession. Output and employment data for the entire textile and clothing industry do 
not exist. We have, therefore, estimated these figures in table 12 on the basis of information available on 
enterprises with independent accounting system at township level and above (these are legal entities with 
fixed location, financial autonomy and authority to enter into contracts with other enterprises), TVEs, 
and village enterprises. The national output and employment figures are estimated by summing up data 
for enterprises under the independent accounting system and the village enterprises. These are lower-
bound estimates since some township enterprises are not covered under the enterprises with independent 
accounting system. To that extent the national figures may be underestimated. An upper-bound estimate 
is obtained by assuming that no TVEs are included under the independent accounting system. 
Unfortunately, we have no information on the size of TVEs that belong under this system. Therefore, no 
precise estimates, which will be somewhere between the upper and lower bounds, can be made. 
 
China imports such textile inputs as cotton, textile fibres (China was the largest importer of textile 
fibres in 1995 with total imports of US$5 billion) and textile machinery. Its imports of clothing, yarns 
and fabrics, textile machinery, and high-quality dying equipment have increased. In 1995, the total 
textile machinery imports of $2.55 billion equalled the total value of textile machinery products made in 





 Share of textile industry in national economy: 



















Share of textile output value in the  total industry
Share of profits and taxes contribution by textile industry
Export share of textile industry
Employment share of textile industry
Source:  Almanac of China's Textile Industry (original in Chinese), various issues. 
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In principle, with import liberalization and 
further decline in import tariffs after the accession, 
textile imports, especially of textile machinery 
will increase, as global competition will 
necessitate technological modernization to raise 
labour productivity. An increase in Chinese 
average incomes should witness a rise in the 
demand for imported high-quality brand names, 
which are already increasingly being produced 
within China. While imports of final textile 
products (e.g. brand names) will displace domestic 
consumption, that of necessary material inputs 
will actually raise domestic production. The import/export ratio in textiles and clothing (not including 
textile machinery) has been declining during the past few years (table 13), which indicates improved 
balance of trade in textiles. 
 
The textile sector underwent significant structural changes during the last two decades. From 
table 12 we can see that the number of textile enterprises was reduced by more than half from 24.6 
thousand in 1991 to 11.2 thousand in 1998. Total employment in these enterprises declined from 7.6 
million to nearly 4 million during the same period. In the case of clothing, the number of enterprises 
declined from 17.5 thousand to nearly 7 thousand, and employment, from 1.7 million to 1.3 million. 
The number of TVEs also declined. This situation reflects the reorganization of enterprises into more 
efficient entities and the closure of inefficient SOEs. However, while employment declined in textiles 
TVEs, it increased in clothing TVEs. 
 
During the 1990s, SOE profitability in textiles declined due not only to growing competition 
from non-state enterprises, but also to loosening of government control on wages in the wake of 
greater enterprise autonomy, and on social burdens in the form of expenditures on workers’ health and 
education and pensions. On the basis of a sample of 700 SOEs during 1980–1994, Zheng, et al. (2001) 
estimate that the efficiency levels were low: productivity growth was generally achieved through 
increase in capital investment rather than improvements in technical efficiency. The efficiency index 
for textile industry increased only marginally from 1.04 in 1980–1981 to 1.17 in 1993–1994. 
 
The market shares for textiles are much higher for SOEs than for FFEs, but the reverse is the 
case for clothing. The shares of SOEs for textiles, however, declined over time whereas those of FFEs 
in textiles increased (table 14). As textiles require more sophisticated technology and greater 
investment than clothing SOEs have traditionally been engaged in this sector more than in clothing. It 
is not certain that an increase in FFEs, with better technology and relatively higher labour productivity 
(due to higher capital-labour ratio and overstaffing in SOEs) can compensate for employment losses 
resulting from the closure of domestic firms. However, most of the FFEs in textiles and clothing and 
other consumer goods belong to overseas Chinese from Hong Kong (China) and Taiwan Province of 
China whose technological levels may not be much higher. (FFEs in the assembly of automobiles are 
different since the world’s leading manufacturers are involved) (see below). 
 
Comparative data on efficiency indicators for SOEs and FFEs are not available. However, it 
appears that China’s competitiveness in textiles and clothing has so far been maintained by shifting 
production from state-owned enterprises to non-state-owned enterprises including rural small 
enterprises, private enterprises, joint ventures and FFEs. TVEs play a very important role in China’s 
textile and clothing exports (table 12). However, the growth of TVEs in China is very uneven across 
regions and provinces. Among the total output value in textile and clothing industry produced by 
TVEs in 1995, over 83 per cent came from only five provinces. Jiangsu and Z hejiang, the two 
provinces with a sizeable TVE production, account for 68 per cent of the national total. 
 
Table 13 




















Source:  Foreign Economic Statistical Yearbook  (Zhongguo 






























                 
Textiles                 
Total sales  310.1    425.7    416.2    414.8   
State-owned  152  49  173.3  40.7  138.2  33.2  148.4  35.8 
Foreign-funded  -  -  76.1  17.9  77.6  18.7  88.3  21.3 
Non-state-owned 
domestic  -  -  176.3  41.4  200.2  48.1  178.1  42.9 
                 
Clothing                 
Total sales  81.8    134.6    160.2    184.7   
State-owned  8.1  9.9  9.1  6.7  8.5  5.3  13.5  7.3 




-  -  57.1  42.4  79.7  49.8  80.3  43.5 
Source:  China Statistical Yearbook, various issues. 
Note:  Market shares are percentages of total sales.  - = not available.  
1 Billion Yuan.  
2 Per cent. 
 
Does China still have a competitive 
advantage in textiles and clothing sectors 
even after experiencing almost twenty years 
of rapid export growth? To answer this 
question, we need to examine where China’s 
competitive advantage lies and where there is 
still potential for further growth. Many factors 
affect a country’s competitive advantage in 
international trade: resource availability, unit 
labour cost, research and development, 
structural response to changes in international 
market and the exchange rate. China has a 
competitive edge in terms of materials for 
textile industry and currently it also enjoys a 
labour-cost advantage. It has the lowest unit 
labour cost in spinning and weaving after 
India and Indonesia (table 15). It produces 
one-quarter of the world’s cotton output and 
is the top cotton producer in the world. It is also the largest producer of mulberry cocoons and silk 
materials, accounting for 70 per cent of the world output. The output of ramie fibre accounts for only 1 
per cent of China’s total fibre output but it accounts for 99 per cent of the world total. These factors, 
combined with an abundant rural labour force, will give China a head start in the foreseeable future. 
China cannot meet domestically the total demand for chemical fibre materials; about 20 per cent of 
which is met through imports from abroad. China’s ability to raise production of chemical fibre 
materials will be enhanced after the accession.  
 
Currently China’s regions (particularly the eastern coastal) where most textile and clothing 
exports are produced, do not have a comparative advantage in terms of labour cost compared to India, 
Indonesia and other developing countries. However, China’s inland regions and provinces, which 
supply a large proportion of textile materials, still enjoy abundant labour supply at a very low labour 
cost. A combination of natural resources and cheap labour in the middle and western regions and a 
sharing of funds, technologies, marketing channels and experience with enterprises in the coastal areas 
(an explicit government policy to develop the hinterland) will, in principle, enable China to continue 
to enjoy a comparative advantage in the world textile and clothing market after the accession. In fact, 
this phenomenon may be similar to the ‘flying goose model’ of trade and development according to 
which the more industrially advanced countries with higher value-added and capital-intensive 
Table 15 
Labour cost comparisons in spinning and weaving in 
selected countries, 1980–1996 
(US$ per hour) 
  1980  1984  1987  1990  1993  1996 
China  0.25  0.26  0.23  0.37  0.36  0.58 
India  0.60  0.71  0.65  0.72  0.56  0.56 
Rep. of Korea  0.78  1.89  1.77  3.22  3.66  5.56 
Hong Kong 
(China)  1.91  1.65  1.93  3.05  3.85  4.90 
Indonesia  0.22  0.23  0.20  0.25  0.43  0.52 
Mexico  3.10  2.62  0.83  2.21  2.93  1.52 
Source:  Excerpt from  Almanac of China’s Textile Industry  1996. 
Figures for China and Indonesia for 1980 are taken from Shi 
(2001). 
Note:  Figures include social charges; based on the US dollar 
exchange rate on 7 May 1996. Data for 1980–1989 and 1996 
are for spring and 1990 and 1993 data are for summer periods.  
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industries pass on the older (mature) labour-intensive industries to less-developed and more labour-
abundant countries where labour-costs are much lower (for early attempts at testing the model, see 
Panchamukhi, 1992; Rao and Das, 1995). A similar flying geese pattern may emerge within China 
involving relocation of production to the lower labour-cost hinterland. This is an interesting area for 
further research. 
 
There is considerable controversy about the status of China’s textile industry in terms of exports 
and employment in the post-accession period. Bach, et al. (1996) argue that China will benefit 
substantially through the abolition of the Multi-Fibre Arrangement (MFA) quotas restricting its 
exports of textiles and clothing. This may not necessarily be so at least in the short term for several 
reasons. First, the share of export products under the quota restrictions is quite small. According to 
Yang Donghui, Secretary-General of the Chinese Federation of Textile Industry (CFTI), quota 
restrictions account for less than 27 per cent of the total textile and clothing exports. He noted that 
Chinese exports after the accession were unlikely to increase significantly (China Business Weekly, 
26 December 1999). Second, these restrictions will be lifted only gradually by 2005.Third, 
international competitiveness of the Chinese textile industry has been declining over time. A global 
competitiveness index for textiles estimated by GATT shows that for China it declined from 0.104 in 
1989 to 0.014 in 1993. On the other hand, the index for Pakistan increased from 0.856 to 0.946, and 
for Indonesia, from 0.276 to 0.406. For clothing also the competitiveness index for China slightly 
declined whereas it increased slightly for Indonesia (cited in Yu, et al. 2000). These estimates are 
consistent with declining indices of China’s revealed comparative advantage in textiles (Shafaeddin, 
2002). Fourth, the inclusion of safeguard provisions to last till 2008 (as under the 1999 bilateral China-
United States agreement regarding China’s accession to the WTO) are heavily biased against China 
and possible anti-dumping duties can discourage its textile exports even after the phasing out of MFA. 
Finally, a global phenomenon of supply of textiles exceeding demand is likely to worsen in the wake 
of economic recession that is already looming. 
 
Thus China may not be able to expand employment substantially through exports of textiles and 
garments. It may, however, be able to do so (as argued above) if it can exploit differences in labour 
costs across regions by relocating production in low labour-cost areas. Coastal areas are already 
attracting a lot of low-cost labour from the hinterland to overcome local labour shortages but freer 
labour mobility to these areas will be necessary. 
 
The more optimistic estimates of Chinese exports and employment assume that a) low labour 
costs will provide China a substantial comparative advantage, b) a decline in the number of SOEs and 
an increase in non-state enterprises in textiles will improve competitiveness, and c) employment 
through clothing exports, which are more significant, will more than compensate for any loss of 
employment in textiles. For example Ianchovichina, et al. of the World Bank cited in table 6 estimate a 
decline in employment in textiles by 18 per cent between 1995 and 2005 but an increase in 
employment in clothing by 70 per cent during the same period. 
 
B.  Automobiles 
 
Automobiles are quite different from textiles because they represent a sheltered domestic 
market. China does not export many automobiles. As noted in table 4, the industry is highly protected, 
which limits competition to firms producing and selling in the domestic market. The industry consists 
of a few large SOEs and joint ventures of SOEs with foreign manufacturers (e.g. Volkswagen, Honda, 
General Motors, and Citroen). The latter are more efficient; their presence raises the average 
efficiency of the industry despite lack of much domestic competition.  The Chinese automotive 
industry is not young although it enjoys protection as an infant industry. The First Automobile Factory 
was established in July 1956, in Changchun, Northeast China. However, mass production of 
automobiles started only in the mid-1980s.
8 The average annual output of the industry remains very 
                                                 
8 In March 1989, the State Council issued industry policy guidelines, in which automobile industry was listed as 
the government priority for investment. The government supported six automobile manufacturing bases, 
including the First Automobile Factory, Second Automobile Factory, and auto manufacturers in Shanghai, 
Tianjim, Beijing and Guangzhou.  
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low compared to that of the leading rival foreign firms. Labour productivity is also much lower 
compared to that of foreign manufacturers – only 2 to 4 vehicles per worker a year compared to 20 to 
40 vehicles in the foreign industry (Yang, 1999). Much lower productivity means that the unit cost of 
production of a Chinese automobile and its price is higher, by about 40–50 per cent, than a similar 
model produced abroad (SETC, 1999, 2000). 
 
China’s automotive industry has experienced a fundamental change in terms of output 
composition, technology and market structure since the Government introduced the Automobile 
Industry Policy in 1994. Until the early 1990s, the industry produced mainly medium-sized trucks. 
Few automobiles or heavy trucks were produced at that time. In the late 1980s, production was 
switched from trucks to automobiles. In 1980, of the total automotive units produced in China, 
automobiles accounted for only 2.44 per cent, and trucks, nearly 61 per cent. By 1999, the share of 
automobiles increased to 31 per cent whereas that of trucks declined to less than 32 per cent (figure 5). 
 
The automotive industry has made 
rapid progress since the early 1980s. From 
1986 to 1999, the number of vehicles 
produced in China increased from 373 
thousand to nearly 1832 thousand; value 
added, from Y6.2 b illion to nearly Y75 
billion; and employment, from 1.3 million in 
1986 to 1.8 million in 1999 (table 16). The 
industry also generates indirect employment 
through such related activities as after-sales 
maintenance and repair services, gas stations 
and so on.  Before the 1980s, demand for 
automobiles was met by imports as the 
industry produced only medium-sized trucks. 
In 1980, China produced 5,418 automobiles 
and imported 19,570, which was equivalent 
to 3.6 times the number of automobiles 
produced in China. From 1981 to 1990, China imported 351 thousand automobiles, that is, more than 
twice the number produced domestically. By 1999, the number of automobiles produced in China 
reached 565.4 thousand with a total annual production capacity of more than 1 million. 
 
Table 16 
Main economic indicators of China’s automotive 
industry 
 
1986  1995  1999 
 
Number of enterprises  2422  2479  2362 
Total employment
1  1290844  1952542  1806815 
Value of industrial output
2  21.29  221.65  312.27 
No. of vehicles produced
3   372.75  1452.70  1831.60 
Industrial value added
2  6.22  54.07  74.89 
Export value
2  -  3.97  6.19 
Total profits
2  2.4  8.56  10.65 




The figures include motorcycle manufacturers. 
1 Number of workers.  
2 Billion Yuan.  
3 (1000). 
Figure 5


















Total Trucks Jeeps Vans and coaches Automobiles
Source:  China Automotive Industry Yearbook, various issues. 
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The automotive industry remains heavily protected despite the periodic lowering of import 
tariffs. The level of import tariffs on automobiles is still twice the level of average import tariff (as of 
March 2001, the average level was 15 per cent). Import tariffs are much higher on automobiles than on 
auto parts and components. By July 2006, the import tariffs on automobiles will be reduced to 25 per 
cent (from the current level of 70–90 per cent) and on auto components, to 10 per cent ( China 
Automotive Industry Yearbook, 2000). 
 
As noted above, China’s automotive industry is not export-oriented. In 1999, China exported a 
total number of 10,095 assembled vehicles, of which 3,868 were trucks and 326 automobiles, the rest 
being vans and other specialized vehicles. It was auto parts and components which captured the world 




1.  Implications of the WTO entry for China’s automotive industry 
 
As the industry is currently heavily protected against foreign competition, a large tariff 
reduction after accession will create problems, which call for serious attention.  
 
a)  Quality and cost considerations 
 
The current market structure of the industry is oligopolistic, with the bulk of marketing in the 
hands of a few large state-owned firms. In 1998, the top five firms accounted for 62 per cent of the 
total market (Liu, 2000). However, the number of automobile firms has declined from 283 in 1994 to 
123 in 1998, with a subsequent substantial increase in average output per firm. Of the top five firms, 
only one is making losses. Nevertheless, pressure for quality, efficiency and cost will be intensified 
after the accession. Large joint-venture firms will strengthen their positions with the help of advanced 
foreign technology. Small high-cost firms will probably be squeezed out of the market. 
 
Figure 6









Source:  China Automotive Industry Yearbook, 2000. 
   Note:  The figures include trucks, automobiles, auto parts and components, motor cycles and engines. 
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It is interesting to note that the domestic industry succeeded in regaining market shares from 
foreign companies. The share of imported automobiles fell from 41 per cent of the total sales in 1994 
to only 3.4 per cent in 1998 (Yang, 1999). One reason for this dramatic change despite low economies 
of scale and lack of modern technology seems to be the success of foreign automobiles assembled in 
China (e.g. Volkswagen and Peugeot) by joint ventures with Chinese SOEs. In an oligopolistic 
structure, large automobile firms compete with smaller ones for market shares by reducing price. The 
sale of automobiles in the domestic market depends on price, quality and technology. Although the 
price of Chinese automobiles is higher, their quality and technology need not be low considering that 
leading world producers of automobiles are based in China. Home-made foreign automobiles such as 
Peugeot and Volkswagen are capable of competing with imported vehicles. 
 
There will no doubt be more imported automobiles in the Chinese domestic market in the post-
accession period. But foreign manufacturers will face competition from ‘foreign makes’ produced 
within China. They will not enjoy a comparative advantage in selling in the Chinese market vehicles 
produced and imported from abroad. It is, therefore, not certain that imported automobiles will capture 
a significant market share even when the tariff is lowered. After all as noted above, between 1994 and 
1998, the Chinese joint ventures with foreign firms succeeded in regaining market share even though 
during this period import tariff rates on automobiles were lowered from 110–150 per cent to 807–100 
per cent (Yang, 1999). In the long run, the market shares will be maintained or expanded only by 
raising further productivity and technological levels and by reducing production costs. As labour costs 
are already very low in China, cost reduction by worker lay-offs will not be very significant. Instead, 
overall co1st reduction will require a lowering of materials and overhead costs. 
 
Some observers believe that China’s automotive industry will be non-competitive after the 
accession because of lower productivity and higher cost per vehicle noted above. While this may well 
be true, Liu (2000) argues that the cost analysis is misleading because of the much lower labour costs 
in China, the existence of unutilized capacity and exaggeration of total production costs which include 
costs of components. Adjustments for the above factors reduce the cost per vehicle from the oft-quoted 
US$15,300 to US$11,500. In the post-accession period, lowering of tariffs will mean a fall in prices of 
imported vehicles and a much keener competition in the domestic market. This will result in squeezing 
of profits. 
 
b)  Unemployment 
 
Closing down of inefficient firms will add to unemployment. The use of more modern 
technology will further reduce the demand for labour. This phenomenon has already been at work. 
There are two interesting developments: First, total employment dropped by almost 146 thousand 
between 1995 and 1999, representing 7.5 per cent of the sector’s workforce, although the total sales 
value increased from Y218 billion to Y312 billion during the same period, or an increase of 43 per 
cent. This is the result of an increase in efficiency through the use of new labour-saving technology. 
Second, both sales and employment in SOEs and collectives declined in 1999 compared to 1995. 
SOEs accounted for 63 per cent of total sales and 77 per cent of total employment in 1995 and 37 per 
cent and 55 per cent respectively in 1999. On the other hand, joint ventures and other ownership types 
(joint stock and private companies) has shown an upward trend. In 1995, both sales by joint ventures 
and others represented about 39 per cent of total sales; by 1999 the figure increased to 59 per cent 
(figure 7). The employment shares rose from 13 per cent to 38 per cent during the same period 
(table 17). These changes reflected efficiency gains, which were brought about by a combination of 
factors, namely the introduction of new technology, foreign investment, privatization, and closure of 
some loss-making SOEs and collective firms. These trends will continue after the WTO entry, as the 











Sales and employment by ownership in the Chinese automotive industry 

















                 
1995  137,101  1,507.6  14,396  196.2  54,953  129.4  11,064  119.2 
1997  149,666  1,441.8  20,924  229.3  72,120  163.4  20,787  143.7 
1999  115,754  996.9  12,815  125.8  94,122  176.6  88,777  507.5 
                 
Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook (in Chinese), various issues. 
Note:
1 Million Yuan.  
2 (000). 
 
Thus by 2005 employment in automotive industry is likely to decline considerably. 
Ianchovichina, et al. (2000) estimate that employment of unskilled labour in automobiles will decline 
by 65.5 per cent between 1995 and 2005, whereas it would have increased by 8.4 per cent in the 
absence of the accession. Employment of skilled labour is also estimated to decline by over 51 per 
cent during the same period. However, it would have increased by 53 per cent if there were no 
accession (table 6). Thus, lowering of tariffs and global competition would have a substantial negative 
employment effect in automobiles. 
 
c)  Technology gap 
 
It is the Chinese government policy to encourage joint ventures and to make foreign brands in 
China in order to attract modern technology. Domestic automobile firms will gradually gain 
experience through learning by doing. Huge domestic market and a gradual decrease in tariffs will 
give China’s automobile firms some breathing space. The manufacture of auto parts and components 
for foreign brands will impose high-quality standards that will make it necessary to use advanced 
technology. It is hoped that through this way the industry’s technological gap with their international 
counterparts will be closed. This is what happened in the electrical and electronic sector. It is not 
certain whether the same success can be achieved by the automotive industry. There are limitations to 
the introduction of advanced foreign technologies through joint ventures. A foreign firm will be 
reluctant to transfer the most advanced technology to the joint-venture firm if its share in the joint 























Percentage shares of automotive sales by ownership
Source: China Automotive Industry Yearbook, various issues. 
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A recent report  notes  that China’s technological gap with developed countries in  the 
manufacturing of conventional automobile powered by an engine is 20 years but the gap is only 4–5 
years for producing electrical automobiles (People’s Daily, 19 September 2001). This may give China 
some hope for competing with overseas automobile manufacturers (Research Group, Development 
Research Centre of State Council, 1998). After the accession, Chinese firms can export more labour-
intensive products to the world market and import m ore intermediate and capital goods embodying 
higher technology at lower costs. 
 
d)  National vs world brands 
 
There is still a long way to go for China to succeed in introducing a national brand in the 
international market. China faces a big challenge here. There is no evidence that China’s automotive 
industry has the resources and the technology capability to design and develop a new automobile 
which can compete in the global market. However, this will not of course prevent the industry from 
being successful in producing good-quality foreign brands for the domestic and world markets. 
 
China’s automobile market is dominated by the world brands and it will continue to do so after 
the accession. In 1998, of the total automobile sales, 91.7 per cent were domestically assembled 
foreign brands, and 3.4 per cent were imported. Home brand models accounted for less than 5 per 
cent. Even these were produced by joint ventures with large foreign firms. It is clear that the potential 
market for automobiles in China is very large. Competition for obtaining a share in this market will be 
fierce. 
 
The accession has certainly shaken China’s heavily protected automotive industry. Opinions 
vary about its future in the post-accession period. There are those who believe that the industry will 
not be able to face severe competition. On the other hand, the senior staff members of MOFTEC and 
SETC1 whom we met in April 2001 are more optimistic about the industry’s future, considering the 
existence and growth of joint ventures with foreign firms with superior technology, marketing and 
access to global markets. 
 
We believe that the future is not so bright for China’s automobile industry. However, the 
industry will not collapse. It can survive as long as the government chooses the right policy to attract 
manufacturing capability to China for producing automobiles to satisfy large domestic and global 
demand. 
 
C.  Household appliances 
 
China has a large domestic market for household appliances in which Chinese firms (both state-
owned and private) compete successfully with foreign firms. China’s household appliances production 
did not start until the early 1980s. At that time the household appliances market was dominated by 
foreign brands. The 1990s witnessed an extraordinary expansion of Chinese domestic production of 
these goods. Between 1996 and 1998 market shares of products manufactured by domestic firms, 
including SOEs increased at the expense of foreign brands. The large market share enjoyed by 
imported foreign goods gave way to Chinese brands. Such foreign brands as Sony, Panasonic, and 
Philips which dominated the market before, have now been replaced by national brands, e.g. 
Changhong TV, Haier refrigerator, and Small Swan washing machine. 
 
China’s household appliances sector expanded rapidly from the mid-1980s to the mid-1990s 
(figure 8). According to China’s Household Appliances Association, China’s output of household 
washing machines accounted for 24 per cent of the total world production, refrigerators, 16 per cent 
and air conditioners, 30 per cent. China has become the largest producer of refrigerators, air 







How have Chinese firms succeeded in improving their market shares in the face of foreign 
competition? First, Chinese firms imported new technology from abroad, which facilitated good-
quality production. Second, the production costs are much lower in China, due partly to lower labour 
costs. Third, Chinese firms are adaptable to local demand and designs. They manufacture products 
according to Chinese consumer tastes and preferences. One example is Haier’s market strategy and 
quick adaptation to consumer demand. Haier introduced a small washing machine which washes a 
little more than one change of clothing. It became very popular in places like Shanghai with cramped 
living conditions but with preference for wearing clean clothes. Further, washing machines were 
adapted to avoid clogging when it was discovered that Sichuan peasants used them for rinsing newly 
dug sweet potatoes (The Economist, 1997). Chinese consumers prefer big freezing compartments in 
refrigerators. Moreover, players for the Chinese consumers need to be more robust for the low-quality 
CDs and VCDs that are available in the market. Those produced by Sony and Philips are sometimes 
more sensitive and selective to the discs that can be played, which led to the gradual loss in their 
market share against their Chinese counterparts. Fourth, products are sold at very low prices. Tariff 
protection encouraged the domestic production of many consumer items that were formerly imported. 
Competition among Chinese firms is very fierce and many “price wars” (TV price war, refrigerator 
price war and air conditioner price war), have been waged in the past. Firms must increase their 
economic efficiency if they are to survive these price wars. Many small firms were closed or merged 
with large firms as they were unable to face competition. 
 
Chinese firms have raised their market shares at the expense of foreign suppliers through price-
cutting. Changhong, the top manufacturer of TV sets (previously a military firm) started a price war in 
March 1996 by reducing the price of a colour TV set by 18 per cent. By the end of 1997, Changhong 
raised its market share in colour television sets to 33 per cent, becoming the number one firm in colour 
television market. In April 1996, the market share of domestic brand was only 42.5 per cent. By April 
1997, the big four firms (Changhong, Panda, Hessi and TCL) accounted for 65 per cent of the market 
(see Mo, 1999). Finally, many large firms set up national after-sales service networks with which 
Chinese consumers are more comfortable when something goes wrong with their purchased 
appliances. It is also easier to obtain spare parts and components for domestic brands. Labour cost of 
producing these parts in China is much lower which drives foreign suppliers out of the market. 
 
Figure 8
























Refrigerators Washing machines Colour television sets
Source:  China Statistic Yearbook, 2000. 
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Today several Chinese firms have already entered the American and European markets. After 
the accession, they will further expand into these markets facing more intense competition. Haier, the 
largest household appliances firm, has set up factories in Indonesia and the United States, and has 
captured 20 per cent of the United States market for small refrigerators. 
 
The Chinese household appliances sector has experienced three development stages. The first, 
from late-1970s to mid-1980s represents the initial market entry of domestic firms. During this stage 
foreign products were predominant. The second consisted of fast growth of domestic firms during the 
mid-1980s and mid-1990s, with annual output growing at double digits. Since the mid-1990s, the 
sector has entered the third stage which is characterized by a period of slow growth (perhaps coupled 
with the economic cycle), more competition, and greater pressures on profit margins. Many 
manufacturers of television sets, VCD players, microwave ovens, air conditioners, washing machines 
and refrigerators have experienced a reduction in output and profits. Many Chinese firms have even 
been making losses.  
 
1.  Exports and employment 
 
Domestic market growth has slowed down 
since the second half of the 1990s due to urban 
market saturation and the limited size of the rural 
market. These have forced Chinese firms to 
expand globally. Traditionally, the main export 
products to the foreign markets included small 
electric fans and hair dryers. But recently, air 
conditioners and microwave ovens have been 
added to the list of exports (table 18). Chinese 
firms export not only to other developing 
countries but also to the United States and 
European markets. 
 
After the accession, reduction of tariffs on 
household appliances will have a marginal effect 
on foreign firms in the Chinese market. Imported 
goods will not have much advantage over local 
suppliers as many famous brand goods are 
already made or assembled by Chinese firms in the form of Original Equipment Manufacture (OEM).
9 
As Chinese domestic firms gain experience in manufacturing and services through learning by doing, 
they will look for external markets for their excess production capacity. The total production capacity 
for major household appliances is almost double that of domestic demand. Lower duties and access to 
international market may prevent at least some Chinese firms from extinction. Household appliances 
in China are already very cheap. Lower tariffs on imported parts and components will further help 
reduce production costs and expand exports. 
 
Although the penetration rate of household appliances in urban areas has gone up substantially, 
the average penetration rate in China is still quite low. China’s large market potential is a big attraction 
to foreign firms. However, these firms can no longer compete with local firms by shipping products 
manufactured abroad into China. Therefore, they have changed their production and marketing 
strategy and have set up joint ventures with domestic enterprises to produce refrigerators and TV sets 
in China. 
 
Early in 2001, Toshiba, the Japanese household appliances producer decided to stop producing 
TV sets in Japan and to transfer all production to China. In August 2001 the company decided to move 
washing machines to China to be assembled by Little Swan, the largest Chinese washing machine 
                                                 
9 OEM is contracted production or manufacturing of goods under which the product does not bear the name of 
the manufacturer. Instead it has brand names attractive to buyers. 
Table 18 
Exports of household appliances, 1999 




     
Electric fans  140.08  650.82 
Air conditioners  2.02  489.01 
Microwave ovens  5.82  356.43 
Refrigerators  2.13  164 
Washing machines  0.64  59.32 
TV sets  12.98  803.12 
Radios  127.78  299.19 
Sound recording apparatus  161.52  2337.02 
Source: Data for electric fans, TV sets, radios and sound 
recording apparatus are taken from  China Foreign 
Economic Statistical Yearbook 2000  (original in 
Chinese). Other data are from Yu (2000).  
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manufacturer. In the initial stage, Toshiba will have 500,000 washing machines assembled annually by 
Little Swan. The total annual output is expected to double by 2005. 
 
China’s domestic appliances sector provides direct employment to  200,000 (China Business 
Weekly, 13 February, 2001), but the indirect effect on employment could be many times higher. For 
instance, the largest microwave oven maker, Glanz group, employs 11,000 people but according to Yu 
Xiaochang (company’s Deputy Executive Director), Glanz provides indirect employment of 1 million 
jobs  in such subsidiary operations as supply of spare parts and components and repair and 
maintenance services (see 21CN, 11 May 2001).
10 In 2000, sales of microwave ovens made by Glanz 
Group accounted for 74 per cent of the domestic market and 35 per cent of the world market. 
 
Table 19 gives employment for major household appliances but they are only a part of total 
employment in the sector. There are no detailed figures available for such appliances as air 
conditioners and microwave ovens, VCD and DVD players, for example. A large number of jobs are 
also provided in the manufacture of such small devices as hair dryers, kettles, toasters, fruit juice 
makers, food processors and kitchen smoke extraction fans. 
 
Table 19 
Employment in major household appliances 
(000) 
         1991         1993         1995         1997         1999 
           
Washing machines  40.8  36.6  38.5  40.2  34.6 
Refrigerators  60.0  53.4  42.3  47.5  43.5 
Electric fans  59.9  43.6  33.5  31.0  9.1 
TV sets  -  173.4  167.9  150.7  133.1 
Radios and auto recorders  -  139.2  115.3  92.5  83.7 
Video recorders  -  -  9.8  13.6  17.3 
Source:  Employment figures for washing machines, refrigerators and electric fans are from China’s Light Industry Yearbook, various 
issues; Figures for TV sets, radios and audio recorders and video recorders are from China’s Electronic Industry Yearbook, 
various issues. 
 
The manufacturers of domestic appliances are under the control of different government 
departments. Some were under the responsibility of the Ministry of Light Industry, and others of the 
Ministry of Electronic Industry. These two ministries however have now been dismantled. Thus output 
and employment data from one source may not give a complete picture of the whole sector. The 
figures in table 19 are therefore understated. 
 
It  is difficult to assess employment prospects in the sector in the post-accession period. 
Although some efficient companies have increased their market share and employment, the sector as a 
whole has seen  a  reduction  in  employed workers. I t is fair to say that  the Chinese household 
appliances sector has made excellent progress in less than two decades; there should therefore be good 
prospects for creating additional employment if more export orders continue to arrive, which seems 
likely. Even if additional employment is not substantial, the increase in exports will at least maintain 
the present workforce. 
 
2.  Household appliances vs automobiles 
 
A comparison between the household appliances industry and automobile industry highlights 
some interesting points. Features common to both industries are the introduction of foreign technology 
and the assembly of products in China using imported parts and components. Both were successful in 
manufacturing goods in China and in reducing dramatically the demand for imports. But their 
differences are also striking. In the household appliances sector Chinese firms have successfully 
                                                 
10 Internet paper, www.21Cn.com.  
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created the national brands which have replaced foreign brands to dominate the entire sector. They 
have expanded further into foreign markets and compete with foreign firms in their market place. The 
automobile industry, however, can only manage to assemble foreign brands to reduce importation. 
 
The degree of protection presents another sharp contrast between the two. The household 
appliances market was exposed to competition much earlier than the automobiles market. Protection of 
household appliances was much lower than that of automobiles. This may be due to the following 
reasons. First, in the late-1970s and early-1980s, tariffs on imported household appliances were quite 
high. But the demand for these goods was also very high. The possibility of making large profits 
induced many local authorities to support the setting up of many factories assembling household 
appliances. However, over-capacity created strong competition as a result of which consumers 
benefited. A favourable market condition for the household appliances industry occurred much earlier 
than the automobile industry. Second, the technology required for the automobile industry is much 
more complex and the size of investment much higher than that for the household appliances. Third, 
government policy may partly explain different situations of the two industries. 
 
One of the shortcomings in the Chinese automobile and household appliances industries is that 
core technology and core parts are still being imported. It will, therefore, take time and resources for 
Chinese firms to be able to compete with international giants on an equal footing. The accession will 




IV.   CHINA'S POSSIBLE RESPONSE TO GLOBAL COMPETITION 
 
 
If trade liberalization and the resulting global competition hurts China’s domestic industry, 
especially SOEs and employment, in principle, China may respond in several ways: i) non-compliance 
of the WTO accord or to a re-negotiation of the accord; ii) devaluation of the currency to make 
imports more expensive in order to discourage import competition and protect employment; and iii) 
shifting production from tradeables to non-tradeables. 
 
A.  Non-compliance 
 
A general feeling is that China has given away too much to enter the WTO and that the 
domestic costs in terms of loss of employment and social hardships, at least in the short run, may be 
too high. It is assumed that in the absence of protection in the post-accession period, SOEs will incur 
insolvency, firm closures and unemployment. China has already started the process of SOE 
restructuring, which may take longer than the phase-in period of five to six years. Thus China may not 
be able to complete such restructuring during the transitory phase-in period under the Protocol of 
Accession. 
 
China’s major trading partners, such as the United States, believe that the phase-in period for 
China should be shorter considering the large size of the Chinese economy, rapid growth of its GDP 
and exports. Special Safeguard Provisions will also be applied to China until 2008 because of its status 
as a non-market economy. This, as noted above,  is the case in particular of textiles and clothing 
exports. 
 
Will China renege on its commitment to WTO rules? To answer this question, one needs to 
analyse what benefits China can derive from this possible action. Unless the social or/and economic 
conditions unexpectedly become very bad, it is unlikely that the Chinese government will renege since 
the cost of breaking WTO rules can be quite high in terms of penalties – the downgrading of credit 
rating and discouraging of FDI inflows. Moreover, China is aware of the legal retaliation mechanisms 




Pessimistic views on China’s WTO accession emphasize the failure of Chinese companies to 
meet foreign competition and massive unemployment as a result of companies’ closure. An article in 
The Economist (15 September 2001) presents a rather gloomy picture. It states: ‘It is impossible to 
honour the kind of promises China has made without upsetting a lot of people whose livelihoods will 
be undermined or whose privileges will be whittled away by the country’s increasing exposure to 
foreign competition’ (p. 49). Some scholars in China also feel that China has given away too much, 
that the Chinese leadership has taken a gamble in joining the WTO, and that in doing so China will 
allow foreign multinationals to take measures over China’s market and turn China into a sub-factory 
of foreign companies (Han, 2000). They interpret China’s WTO membership as a sell-out and a way 
for the United States to gain control of the Chinese economy and to speed up its westernization. Han 
presents an alarming picture of WTO membership resulting in rising unemployment because of the 
closure of uncompetitive enterprises, consumers’ choice in favour of cheaper imported goods, and the 
domination of the Chinese domestic market by foreign multinational enterprises. He quotes the anti-
globalization views in the West to support his criticism of the Government’s decision to join the 
WTO. The fact is that what the anti-globalization supporters in the West are concerned with most is 
job losses as a result of expanding free trade and globalization. This kind of job threat will come 
precisely from such developing countries as China.  
 
There is no doubt that joining the WTO presents a big challenge to Chinese companies as well 
as the government. Some implications of the WTO accession can be very severe, especially in 
agricultural and financial sectors. There are reasons to be alarmed about the difficulties facing Chinese 
companies and society. But the majority of the Chinese people still believe that China stands a good 
chance of success.  China has accumulated  valuable  experience during  the process of reform and 
opening-up during the last two decades. It has been involved in negotiations over its  WTO 
membership  for over 15 years. It is therefore  more  prepared now than before  to take  up  new 
challenges. Besides, China reserves the right to take measures to protect vulnerable sectors which are 
allowed under the WTO rules. China has honoured its international commitments in the past. Scholars 
at the Georgetown University Law Centre in Washington, D.C. have compiled a record of China’s 
compliance with recent international obligations which shows that China’s record, though rather 
mixed, is no worse than that of many other developing countries (Rosen, 1999). 
 
As  noted earlier,  SOEs’ decline,  bankruptcies of  loss-making enterprises and lay-off of 
millions of workers have occurred. These are serious actions and responses of the Chinese government 
before joining  the WTO.  Through these measures the Chinese economy  will make efficiency gains 
and improve its access to world markets. It is therefore difficult to envisage a situation wherein China 
would renege on the WTO agreement. 
 
B.  Devaluation 
 
Some observers believe that in future China may be forced to devalue its currency in order to 
discourage imports and protect employment in inefficient non-competitive industries. Observers may 
again revive the suggestion that China will be tempted/forced to devalue after entry into WTO in order 
to maintain and/or expand its export competitiveness. For example, UNCTAD (1999) noted: ‘… if 
accession to WTO necessitates a devaluation of its currency to protect some of the country’s less 
competitive industrial enterprises (particularly those still under state ownership) against an unexpected 
surge in imports, other countries of the region are likely to be affected in consequence.’ 
 
Devaluation would not be the suitable option for China in its determination to protect its less 
competitive industrial enterprises. It is a double-edged sword.  While it will make imports more 
expensive and thus discourage import competition, it will make exports cheaper unless of course, other 
countries do not set in motion competitive devaluations. But increase in the cost of imports can raise 
the cost of production of export goods since such production is quite import intensive. China’s export 
volume contains over 50 per cent of processed goods involving labour-intensive assembly in which it 
will continue to enjoy comparative advantage in the foreseeable future. Table 20 shows that processed 
exports shot up from  $5.6 billion (or 18 per cent) in 1986 to  nearly $138 billion  (or 55 per cent)  
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in 2000. In the processing of goods (e.g. clothing and footwear), foreign firms provide to Chinese 
TVEs and other non-state firms components and imported inputs for production. They agree to 
purchase the output produced with these inputs for sale abroad. Lardy (1998, pp. 211–212) notes that 
‘because there is no foreign equity position for the firms engaged in the assembly activity, these 
exports do not get reported as joint venture exports’. He estimates that these joint venture exports, 
combined with processing exports amount to about two-thirds of China’s total exports. This is a 
significant proportion of China’s total exports whose competitiveness would be adversely affected if 
China were to devalue. On the other hand, after the WTO accession,  in the absence of such 
devaluation the lowering of tariffs would reduce the cost of imported processing materials. 
 
Table 20 
China’s processed and non-processed exports 





($ billion)  Per cent 
Value 
($ billion)  Per cent 
           
1986  30.9  25.3  81.1  5.6  18.1 
1987  39.4  29.6  75.2  9.0  22.8 
1988  47.5  36.6  77.0  14.0  29.6 
1989  52.5  31.6  60.1  19.8  37.6 
1990  62.1  35.4  57.1  25.4  40.9 
1991  71.8  38.12  53.0  32.4  45.0 
1992  84.9  43.68  51.4  39.6  46.6 
1993  91.7  43.20  47.1  44.2  48.2 
1994  121.0  61.56  50.9  57.0  47.1 
1995  148.8  71.37  48.0  73.7  49.5 
1996  151.1  62.84  41.6  84.3  55.8 
1997  182.8  77.97  42.7  99.7  54.52 
1998  183.8  79.3  43.1  104.5  57.0 
1999  194.9  84.0  43.1  110.9  57.0 
2000  249.2  111.5  44.7  137.7  55.0 
           
Sources:  Lardy (2002); Yang (2000); China Customs Statistics Yearbook. 
 
China relies heavily on import tariffs  exemption for material inputs required for export 
production. This is a method for stimulating exports that discriminates against industries relying more 
on domestic inputs through high protective barriers. This partial and selective liberalization will be 
replaced by comprehensive liberalization after the accession which will reduce the cost of domestic 
inputs to exporters. This may shift production towards exports relying on more domestic rather than 
imported inputs (Ianchovichina, et al ., 2000). Such a shift should have a favourable indirect effect on 
employment. 
 
China currently has foreign reserves of US$212.2 billion and the current account is in surplus. 
China’s foreign debt level is maintained at a healthy level and  the structure of debt leans towards 
medium and long terms. The WTO accession and the hosting of 2008 Olympic Games in Beijing will 
stimulate more FDI inflows into China. Although  the reduction of import tariffs will encourage 
imports, easy access to the world market will promote exports. Vast pools of cheap labour are 
expected to maintain the competitiveness of  the  Chinese labour-intensive manufactures. China’s 
domestic inflation rate is still quite low, due to overcapacity, oversupply and strong competition in the 
domestic market. These factors do not put any pressure on China to devalue. On the other hand, the 
recent weakness of the Japanese Yen (in December 2001 it fell by 7 per cent, to 132 Yen to the dollar 
(The Economist,  2002)) puts pressure on the Asian currencies, including the Chinese Yuan. The 
Chinese official position is critical of the Japanese policy of letting the Yen slide to fight deflation. 
China and the Republic of Korea have warned Japan that the Yen devaluation runs the risk of 





C.  Production shift from tradeables to non-tradeables 
 
China has a large and expanding domestic market to fall back on when world export markets are 
not favourable. It is quite possible that the failure to expand exports rapidly will induce the Chinese 
policy makers to shift production from tradeables to non-tradeables and to domestic market. This 
study had earlier already noted  on the rapidly expanding domestic market for automobiles and 
household appliances. Even in the case of textiles and clothing, the domestic market for such higher-
value added goods as designer clothes and brand names is expanding alongside rising per capita 
incomes. Massive government expenditure can boost domestic demand even if the Chinese economy 
slows down in future, which is likely during global economic recession. Indeed, during the past few 
years China has maintained its high growth rate at around 7 per cent precisely through such measures. 
 
Indeed, for a large economy like the Chinese the export sector is not as important as for smaller 
economies. Large countries are likely to have lower trade ratios than small countries for several 
reasons: i) the largeness of domestic market favours economies of scale; ii) less dependence on 
imports of minerals and raw materials which are locally available; and iii) a natural protection to 
domestic producers because of higher transport costs. China’s export to GDP ratio is exaggerated for 
several reasons. First, China’s exchange-rate-based GDP could be underestimated. The purchasing 
power parity measure of GDP is much higher which would bring down the ratios.
11 Second, a very 
high proportion of exports are processed goods (table 20); if we use the value-added export figure, the 
export contribution to China’s GDP would be very different. Third, China’s  prices of non-traded 
goods (particularly services)  relative to those of tradeables are  artificially low. Therefore, the 
contribution of the service sector to total GDP is relatively smaller than  it would  otherwise be. 




V.   CONCLUSION 
 
 
The analysis in this paper suggests that the impact on China of the accession to the WTO will be 
mixed. The degree of domestic and foreign competition varies from industry to industry. Many 
Chinese industries are already globally integrated and competitive, e.g. electronics, textiles and 
clothing and household appliances. These industries will continue to be competitive in the global 
market although controversy surrounds the future of textiles. Industries enjoying protected domestic 
market (e.g. automobiles) will lose after the accession and will have to accelerate the process of 
restructuring to attain competitiveness. At least initially, they are likely to incur substantial transition 
costs, and inefficient firms will disappear. 
 
SOE ownership in industry is already declining. After the accession, joint ventures between 
Chinese non-state firms and foreign firms will become predominant. At present only SOEs in 
automobiles, for example, are allowed to enter into joint ventures. The process of industrial 
restructuring in general and reform of SOEs in particular, has already been underway for a number of 
years. The WTO accession provides a timely external pressure for furthering this process, which has 
met with opposition within China because of the heavy social costs involved. Unemployment in SOEs, 
which is already mounting, will increase further due to the process of technological modernization and 
bankruptcies. Future employment growth within the manufacturing sector is likely to occur in the 
dynamic non-state and private domestic enterprises, joint ventures and foreign firms. State enterprises 
will increasingly lose their importance as providers of jobs. 
 
                                                 
11 Maddison's estimates based on GDP in terms of purchasing power parity show that Chinese exports rose from 
1.7 per cent of GDP in 1978 to 4.3 per cent in 1995.  These estimates are well below the official Chinese and 
World Bank estimates (Maddison, 1998).  
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While there is consensus that the accession will contribute to GDP growth, its contribution to 
employment growth is the subject of controversy. Optimistic and pessimistic estimates of employment 
prospects abound depending on the assumptions one makes about growth, export prospects, demand, 
employment elasticity and so on. The impending world economic recession does not augur well for 
China’s future prospects of economic growth and export promotion. It is also worrying that the 
employment potential of Chinese growth is very limited because of the low employment elasticity. 
 
Displaced labour from SOEs and inefficient non-state firms will need to be reabsorbed in other 
sectors The private sector, whose contribution to output and employment has been underestimated in 
the past and various types of services, e.g. retailing, distribution, tourism and consultancy services will 
be the major sources of additional employment after the accession. There may also be some scope for 
employment growth in labour-intensive agricultural activities.  China does not have a resource 
advantage in producing such staple crops as foodgrains, feedgrains, sugar and oilseeds which are land 
intensive. However, in other labour-intensive primary export products such as vegetables, fruits, and 
cut flowers, China will enjoy a comparative advantage. Resource reallocation within the primary 
sector will therefore be necessary. 
 
Most of the estimates of the employment impact of the accession consider only  direct 
employment. Direct employment is unlikely to increase significantly in view of the necessity to 
upgrade China’s industry with modern technology. This is particularly so since the employment 
elasticities of output are very low in China. However, much of the additional employment is likely to 
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